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Oregonians to the National Recovery Administration. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Administration (NRA) wa.s almost unbounded enthusiasm in mid-1933. But 
the enthusiasm of the public s business end labor for the NRA noticeably 
declined by early 1934 and it continued to decline until the NRA was 
declared unconstitutional in Ma1 of 1935. The primary objective of 
this stu~ is to determine whether the response ot Oregon to the NRA 
followed that ot the nation. 
Focusing 	mainly upon the Portland metropolitan areas this study 
is based 	on information drawn from newspapers and other primary source 
materials available tor the period during which the b1RA was in existence. 
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While this study does not purport to be a definitive analysis of the 
response of Oregon to the NRA , it does, hopefully, outline the general 
reaction of the state as a whole. 
The response of Oregon to the NRA roughly parallels the nation's. 
The public, the business community, and the labor movement in Oregon 
responded to the NRA much in the same fashion as their counterparts 
'nation-vide. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTR~TION 
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
An inescapable aspect of the first administration of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt is the tremendous burst of activity that consumed 
Washington during the "Hundred Days" special Congressional session of 
March 9 through June 16, 1933. Roosevelt, in his inaugural address,. 
had promised to America that he would pursue a program of action. And 
action there was, in abundance: fifteen major bills were passed by 
Congress in a little over three months. Working at a. staccato pace, 
the 73rd Congress spewed forth a multitude of programs that attacked 
the Depression at nearly every level. 
Unfortunately, much of what was approved by Congress in those hec­
tic days which signaled the beginnings of the New Deal wa.s hastily 
composed and very otten ambiguous in its origins and character. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act serves as perhaps the best example 
ot the confusion and ambiguity embodied within the early legislation of 
the New Deal. Further, the act provides an excellent example of the 
economic inconsistency of the experimental recovery programs of 
Roosevelt's administrations. 
I 
On June 16, exactly one hundred days atter Congress had convened, 
the' National Industrial Recovery Act (NlRA) was signed by Roosevelt. 
Considered to be the capstone to the flurry of legislation that had 
J 
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been passed before it, the NlRA was heralded by Roosevelt as what 
"History probably will record • • • as the most important and far­
reaching legislation ever ena.cted 'by the American Congress."l The 
act was divided into two main parts; the second of which dealt with 
public works and the taxes to finance them• 
.Title II of the NIRA, entitled "Public Works and Construction , 
Projects, tt created the Public Works Administration (PWA) and authorized 
it to spend up to a total of $3,300,000,000 ~n a variety of ~rojects 
ranging "from construction of highways and low-cost housing to conserVa­
tion of natural resources. Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, 
vas appointed head' of the PWA, which was to be in effect for two 
2 years. But it was the first part of the NlRA, Title. I, which drew the 
most attention and publicity.3 
Title I, "Industrial. Recovery,1I established the National, Recovery 
Administration (NRA) which was to oversee the guidelines set forth 
within its portion of the act. The objectives of the NRA were declared 
in rather vague and general terms in the first section of Title I: to 
provide for the general welfare, to remove obstructions to interstate 
4. and foreign commerce, to promote co-operative actions among trade groups, 
lSamuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Pa; ers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. II: The Year of Crisis, 1933 New York: 
Random House, 1938), p. 246. ­
I ~e Public Works Administration was eventUally in existence for 
ten years, until June of 1943. In its lifetime, the PWA sponsored over 
34,000 projects and spent about $6,000,000,000. 
3Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Mono 01 :. A 
Stu in Economic Ambivalence Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1966 , p. 31. 
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Ii . 
to induce and maintain united action between labor and management under 
government supervision and sanctions, to eliminate unfair competition, 
to avoid undue restrictions on production, to increase consumption of 
products b~ increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemplo~-
ment, and to improve standa.rds of labor. The NRA, like the PWA, was 
~o expire in two ~ears •. 
Under the provisions of Title I, business groups and trade 
associations were permitted to formulate indust~-wide "codes- of fair 
competition," in order to limit production and raise prices through 
mutual. agreement, without fear' of anti-trust prosecution. In other 
words, industries were allowed to collude and cartelize, contr~ to 
laws prohibiting such action like the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in 
hopes of preventing cut-throat competition and over-production. The 
government, through the NRA, reserved the power to accept or reject 
these codes of fair competition, to set up its own code when companies 
vithin an indust~ could not agree, and to enforce the codes. No 
industry proved too small for the NRA to tackle: codes eventually 
ranged from the Burlesque TheatriCal and the Covered Button agreements 
to the Ice Cre~ Cone and the Pickle Packing ones. 
In addition to the benefits business received in Title I, labor 
vas given a position of legitimac~ in the American economy through 
Section 7(a) of the NlRA. Described by William Green, President of the 
American Federation of Labor, as a "Magna Charta" for labor and com­
pared with the Emancipation Proclamation by John L. Lewis, President of 
the United Mine '\-1orkers, Section 7(a) was indeed a giant step forward 
~ --------------~------------------------------------------------
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tor the American worker. In Section 7(a), labor was guaranteed the 
right to collective bargaining--without managerial interference--freedom 
4ot choice in organization, and maximum hours and minimum wages. 
Title I of the NIRA was a product of three conflicting plans for 
economic recovery that were advocated by various individuals' and 
groups throughout the l.930' s. Each of these three plans approached the 
Depression from dif~erent directions. 
In one' corner were the neo-Brandeisians, inheritors of the New 
Freedom phil.osophy of Woodrow Wilson; who espoused a program of ~ti-
trust as :being the sol.ution to the Depression. In another corner were 
the successors of Theodore Roosevel.t·s New Nationalism, who felt that 
buSiness seif-governm.ent woul.d take the country out of its economic 
quagmire. In the third corner stood those who fell roughly between the 
New Freedom and the New Nationalism; this group advocated a plan of 
government-business cooperation, or a ,"new competition," as the avenue 
toward recovery. Anti-trusters vere on the political left. Those who 
wanted government-business cooperation we~e in the center. Spokesmen 
of business self-government stood on the'political right. 5 
. 4See Irving Bernstein, .Turbulent Years: A History of the American 
Worker, 1933-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), particularly ·chaps.· 
1-7 for a general account of the effect of Section 7(a) upon labor in 
America. 
~one of these delineations are inflexible classifications. Hawley, 
New Deal and Mononoly-, pp. 36-51, cites the following persons and groups 
as being advocates of the three conflicting plans for economic recovery 
. during the formative and early stages of the NRA. (Shifts in attitude 
were, most certainly, possible. Also, plans espoused by particular in­
dividuals for economic recovery, in 1932 and 1933, were not necessarily 
indicative of their social philosophies in toto.) Those on the political 
right who were advocates of business planning include: Henry I. Harriman, 
President of the American Chamber of Connnerce; Gerard Swope, President ot 
General Electric; Bernard M. Baruch; the American Bar Association; and' 
·1 
p ~----------------------------------------~----------------------------------
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The NIRA was little more than enabling legislation that was 
the result of a compromise between the left, the right, and the center. 
-It could have proceeded down any of those paths for recovery that were 
advocated by spokesmen for anti-trust, government-business cooperation, 
and business self-rule. However, it was the political center that 
spoke of government-business cooperation, as a solution to the Depression 
who won precedence ov~r anti-trusting and business planning in the 
National Recovery A4ministration. But what eventually became of the 
concept of government-business cooperation embodied in the NRA was 
really closer to business planning or industrial self-rule with little 
or no contr:ol coming from Washington. This shift in the actual role of 
the NRA and its relationship to the economy caused no small amount of 
dissension within the agency itself. 6 
One of the more colorful aspects of·the NRA was its flamboyant 
director, Hugh S. Johnson,. and the campaign for public support he led. 
Appointed by Roosevelt as administrator of Title I on the same day the 
HIM was signed by the President, the fifty-one year old Johnson was a 
the National Association of Manufactures. .Those in the center who 
spoke favorably of government-business cooperation (with business either 
as an equal or a junior partner) include: Rexford G. Tugwell; Alexander 
Sachs, a corporation economist; Charles A. Be'ard; Will Durant; George 
Soule; and John Dewey. On the left, anti-trusters and spokesmen for 
national economic planning include: Senators Hugo Black, William 
Borah, and Robert Wagner; Adolf Berle of Roosevelt's "Brain Trust"; 
Francis Perkins; and Felix Frankfurter. 
6Hawley, New Deal and Monopoly, deals with the ~biguity and the 

conflicting goals of the NRA throughout Part I of his book; see 

especially chaps. 2, 3, and 5. 

----------------------------------------------------------------------
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retired United States Army General who had been born and raised in the 

Cherokee Strip of Oklahoma.. He had served as a liaison between the 

Army and the War Industries Board during World War I and had been an 

official of the Moline Plow Company and an associate of Bernard Baruch 

during the 1920's and the ,early thirties. 

Johnson--an early "brain truster" for'Roosevelt--was selected by 

the President as administrator of the NRA at the prompting of Raymond 

, 	 Moley, Roosevelt··s-Assistant Secretary of State and a key figure in 
the "Brain Trust." Johnson's familiarity with governmental organization 
and with big business were points in favo~ of his 'selection as NRA 
administrator. 
Acting like a field marshall leading a civilian attack upon the 

Depression, Johnson drwmned up popul~ support for the b'"RA with the 

1 
Blue Eagle drive, begun in the mid-Summer. of 1933. Johnson, when he ,I 
realized that administrative machinery could not cope with the large 
number of code requests that flooded NRA offices after they opened, 
conceived of a "blanket code," known as the President's Reemployment 
Agreement (PRA).7 
The PRA basically stated that small businesses, after they promised 

to conform to certain wage and hour restrictions, agreed not to raise 

prices, and said that they would not employ child labor, would be 

allowed to display an emblem--the Blue Eag!e--which signaled their 

efforts toward recovery. It was expected that patriotic citizens would 

7More than 200 code· requests were received by the NRA within the 

first month after it opened its offices; 144 came in during the last 

half of July, 546 in August. 
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not patronize businesses which did not display the Blue Ear~e 

insignia. The FRA was to be in effect for any given business until 

, the entire.- ,industry of which that, business was a part came under the 
authority of a regular 'NRA code. Otherwise, the length of time a 
business could operate under the PRA was indefinite. 
To get as many businesses under the PRA as' rapidly as possible, 
Johnson directed a patriotic cam:paign for popular support. Enlisting 
military Jargon to give the Blue Eagle drive as much of a patriotic 
flavor as could be done, Johnson created a great deal of ba.11yhoo_ and 
enthusiasm in the nation at laI."ge. The NRA became 8. mass movement 
with an It. • • a.rm::r of a million and. a half volunteer workers. • .1t 
with field marshall General Hugh S. Johnson giving his "shock troops" 
their marching orders. 8 Parades celebrated the NRA; speeches acclaimed 
it. Nearly 2,500,000 employers and 16,000,000 workers, signed the P?~ 
within a few weeks; the Blue Eagle was to be found in countless store 
windows, on innumerable advertisements, and stamped upon a see]!1..ingly 
infinite number of products. Newly-born baby girls were named Nira. 
NRA ballads flooded the agency's desks. Beauty contests were held 
which picked as their winner Miss NRA. The wings of the Blue Eagle 
had indeed spread over America. 
The administrative mach~nery of the NRA was, to say the least, a 
gargantuan and complex bureaucracy. To cope with the 557 basic codes 
~ationa1 Recovery A@rlnistration, Speakers' Division, Pointe'!, 
Paragraphs for Speakers: The Blue Eagle Drive, in Voices of the 
American Past: Readin~s in American History, ed. by Morton Borden 
JLexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath 'and Company, 1972), p. 299. 
8' 
and 208 supplementary codes it eventually formulated and approved, 
in addition to its adoption of numberless PRA's, the Washington staff 
alon~ of the NRA grew from around 400 in August 1933 to a.bout 4,500 
in early 1935. The network of administrative channels within the NRA 
itself' changed twice in organization during its two-year lifespan.' 
AdDdnistrative development of the NRA consisted of three broad. 
phases: 1) the period of intense code-making, ~une 1933--March 1934; 
2) the reorganization of the NRA for purposes of code administration 
and policy making, March 1934-September 1934; and 3) the general 
reorganization of the NRA and-reorientation of official policy, 
September 1934--MaY 1935.9 
Criticism of the NRA steadily mo~ted after the,excitement of the 
Blue Eagle drive somewhat subsided. Therefore, on February 19, 1934, 
Roosevelt appointed the famous lawyer Clarence Darrow to head ~ 
investigation and analysis of the NRA. Darrow was to report upon 
accusations that the NRA was hindering, rather than stimulating, 
recovery and that it was leaning too much in favor of big business. 
The Batt.onal Recovery Review Board, 'led by Darrow, did a brief study 
and concluded that large corporations dominated the major NRA codes and 
that the small businessman, the worker, and the consumer were being 
squeezed out of, any hope for recovery. The DarroW' committee's prelimi­
nar,y report stated that· there should be a. return to free competition; 
9Leverett S. Lyon, et al., The National Recovery Administration: 
An Analysis and Appraisal (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1935), pp. 47-82, discusses at length the phases of NRA administrative 
development. 
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but its supplementary and final report urged adoption of socialized-
ownership, since free-market capitalism was just as nauseous to Darrow 
" 10 
as the cartel-type organization fostered by the NRA. 
Hugh Johnson's tenure as director of the NRA ended when he 
resigned in Spetember 1934. His experience in the NRA constituted 
both a rewarding and a frustrating period in his' life. He was tre­
mendously proud of what the NRA had done, particularly' for labor: 
"It abolished child l~bor. It ran out the sweatshops. It established 
the principle of regulated hours, wages, and working cond~tions • It 
went far toward removing wages from the area of predatory competition. 
It added to the rights and the freedom of human labor. ,,11 However, 
Johnson's verbosity and his uncompromising character earned him and 
the NRA no mean number of criti~. Furthermore, criticism toward the 
... 
IRA in general frequently tended to be directed at Johnson himself. 
To be sure, the NRA did make some great strides for the American 
worker. But it also acquired the title of the "National. Run Around" 
from many labor spokesmen because Johnson unwelcomely intervened in so 
many labor disputes and strikes. It was called the "National Retro­
·gressive Act" by those' on the far left. The NRA also stopped the 
deflationary spiral. of 1933. But it did not stimulate recovery; it 
lOwilliam E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 

Deal,1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 67-68. 

llHugh s. Johnson, The Blue EatSle "from Egg to Earth (Garden 

Cfty, New York: Doubleday,. Doran & Company, 1935), p. x. 

p' 
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merely kept things from getting worse. In fact, the NRA probably 
hindered recove~ through its support of restrictionism and pri~e 
raising.12 
- The accusations of small businessmen and anti-trusters that the 
-NRA furthered, rather than prevented, the formation of monopolies cannot 
be substaritiate,d to any great degree. Small businessmen 'Were actually 
f 
more disgruntled by-the fact that Section 7(a) prevented them from a 
continuing policy of labor exploitation. Anti-trusters had been 
against the NRA ever since they realized it would not adopt a strin­
·13gent policy of "trust busting. n 
Johnson's successor as the NRA's closest contact to the President 
was Donald R. Richberg, a man who had just as volatile a personality 
as Johnson. But Richberg was capable of masking his feelings behind 
a bland exterior. Richberg had been Johnson's general counsel-and had 
also been at almost constant loggerheads with the General. Richberg 
did not become National Recoveri Administrator; Roosevelt abolished the 
office and replaced it with the newly-created National Recovery Board. 14. 
12Hawley, New Deal, and Monopoly, p. 104; Leuchtenburg, FDR and 

the New Deal, p. 69. 

13Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal, p. 69. 
14Regarding Richbergts work in the ITIRA see his The Rainbow (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday,-Dora.n & Company, 1936) and r!y Hero: The 
Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic Life (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's 80ns, 1954), chaps. XIII-XVII. Helpful, but not overly in­
sightful, on Richberg and the ,NRA is Thomas E. Vadney, The Wayward 
Liberal: A Political Biop,raphy of Donald Richber~ (Lexington, Kentucky: 
The University of Kentucky, 1970), chaps. VI-VIII. 
11 
The National Recovery Board was composed of representatives of 
management, labor, and the public. The Board was incapable of any 
real reorientation of NRA policy because overhauling of codes required 
Congressional approval. And C~ngress itself was not the str~ngest 
supporter of the NRA in iate 1934 and 1935. Congressmen's constit~encies 
were their political futures; public opinion, which was little more 
'than halfhearted for the NRA, forbid much Congressional support for 
it.15 
The constitutionality of the NRA was tested in the Supreme Court 

case of'Schechter Poultry Corporation v. the United States, popularly 

known as the "Sick .chickentl case. Richberg had attempted to relax some 

of the codes and to abandon some of the price-fixing rules of the NRA 

in hopes of stemming criticism. But stemming criticism became a moot 

. point when the Supreme Court declared the NRA unconstitutional on 
May 27, ,1935. In a unanimous decision, the Court stated 'the uncon­
stitutiona.lity of the NRA on two grounds. First, it contradicted the 
constitutional principles of separation of power by its delega~ion of 
power by Congress to the, executive. Second, it included a federal 
regulation of intrastate commerce as well as interstate commerce. 
The demise of the NRA in the "Sick Chi'cken" decision did' not 
cause much sadness on the national. l~vel. Large segments of the 
three groups the New Deal attempted to push toward recovery--consumers, 
15Hawley, New Deal and Monopoly, pp. 137-38; Arthur M.. Schlesinger, 
Jr., 'The'Age'of'Rooseve1t: The Coming of the New Deal, 1233-1935 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), p .. a66. 
12 
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l 
r workers, and businessmen--had become critics of the NRA as early as 
I 
I the beginning of 1934. Consumers complained of high prices. Labor 
contended that the !nlA favored management more than the worker. Small 
businessmen believed that the NRA was shoving them out of the market­
place in favor of big business and that it vas fostering monopolies. 
Big business felt that the government was exercising too much control 
over its economic affairs and labor pOlicies.16 Roosevelt had ~sked 
Congress fo~ a two-year renewal of the NRA in February 1935; but even 
he confessed privately to Frances Perkins, his Secretary of Labor, 
that" the whole thing is a mess. It has been an awful headache. 
Some of the things 'they have done in the NRA are pretty wrong•••• ,,17 
Historical precedent for the NRA rested squarelY upon the example 
of the War Industries Board (WIB) of World War I. The VlIB, under the 
leadership of Bernard Baruch, had effectively coordinated purchasing, 
allocated raw materials, controlled production, and supervised labor 
relations for the domestic war-time mobilization of the American 
economy. Further, anti-trust action was suspended for all practical 
purposes while the l{IB directed the economy. The WIB had proved to 
be a coordinating agency that. was a mutually advantageous experience 
for labor, industry, and government during the First World War. 
Therefore, many people who had had experience in, or contact with, 
. l6Hawley, New Deal and Monopoly, p. 104; Leuchtenburg, FDR and . 
the New Deal, p. 67. 
l7Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Harper 8; Row, 
1946), p. 252. 
,,; 
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the WIB looked back upon 1 t with a particular fondnes s during the 
18
early thirties.
Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of Commerce, William McAdoo, pro­
posed a "Peace Industries Board" in mid-193l. Bernard Baruch, the 
former chairman of the WIB and a. mutual friend and business associate 
ot Hugh Johnson, publically advoca.ted economic planning, for the 
economically depressed nation, along the lines of the WIB in 1930 and 
again in early 1933. Gerard Swope, President of General Electric 
•
and the person who had succeeded Johnson on the WIB, and who was also 
an early spokesman for government suspension of anti-trust laws, sat 
on the Industry Advisory Board of the NRA. Roosevelt himself, as 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had had contact with the WIB. He 
offered this defense of the NRA: 
l~awley, New Deal and Monopoly, pp. 23, 135; Leuchtenburg, FDR 
and the New Deal, pp. 57-58; Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 
176; Charles Frederick Roos, NRA Economic Planning (New York: Da. C~po 
Press, 1971), pp. 4, 35; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Conservative 
Achievements o~ Liberal. Reform, n in The New Deal: The Critical Issues, 
ed. by Otis L. Grah~, Jr. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. ,151. . 
Johnson, The Blue Eagle, makes continual reference·to the experience 
he received in his relations with the WIB as having direct bearing upon 
the NRA; see particularly pp. 101, 114-15. Two ,especially provocative 
and useful articles which deal with the aspects of direct continuity 
between the WIB and the NRA are written by William F. Leuchtenburg, 
"The New Deal and the Analogue of War, It in Change and Continuity in 
Twentieth-Century America, ed. by John Braeman, Robert H. Bermner, and 
Everett Walters, Harper Colophon Books (New York: Harper &Row, 1966), 
pp. 117-23, 133; and Gerald D. Nash, "Experiments in Industrial Mobiliza­
tions: . WIB and NRA," Mid-America, XLV (July,. 1963), 157-74. 
14 
I had a part in,the great' cooperation of 1917 and 1918 and it is 
my faith that we can count on our industry once more to join 'in 
our general purpose to lift this new threat. and to do it without 
taking any a.dvantage of the public trust which has this day bee'n 
reposed without stint in the good faith and high purpose of 
American business.19 
The nation had been able to cope with a federally-d~rected industrial 
mobilization during World War I. The' WIB experience thus served as a 
model for a government-business partnership fifteen years later, when 
the nation was again confronted with a crisis situation. 
That many government officials and administ~~tors of the NRA 
received experience in the WIB does not necessarily cast ~y positive' 
or negative qUalities upon the NRA. However, the fact that the NBA 
was modeled so closely upon the WIB does indicate the inherent weak­
nesses of the NRA. 
Most obviously, the NRA was actually an unimaginative thrust 
by the government into the ~oncept of close cooperation with business 
for the regulation, and hopefully stimulation, of the econoMY'. As 
Gerald D. Nash say's, -"Establishment of the NRA • .'. was not conceived 
as a novel and untried experiment in industrial self-rule, but as a re­
susitation of a tried and proven remedy,'developed only after much 
, . 
experimentation, the' old War Industries, Board. ,,2q Both Nash and William 
E. Leuchtenburg point out that domestic America during World War I 
was an unsatisfactory model for economic mobilization during the 
19Rosenman, ed., Public Papers, Vol. II, pp. 252-53. 

'20Nash , "WID and NRA," 171. 
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Depression because problems Roosevelt faced in 1933 were far and 
awar different than those that Wilson faced in 1917-1919. 21 
College survey texts take two approaches in their coverage of 
the NRA. While some texts generally offer a swift overview of the NRA 
with .little or no historical interpretation of it, others tend to 
neatly tuck the NRA into their discussion of the Hundred D~s and give 
an interpretation of it within the larger concept1l:al i'x"amework of 
the New Deal and its significance in history. 22 
,Historians loosely falling under the category of the "New 
Left" philosophy differ, in their interpret~tion of the New Deal, from 
those coming under the classification of the "Liberal-Democratic" 
school of thought. While the Left s~s that the New Deal was a conserva.­
tive movement, Libera.l-Democratics contend that it constitutes at least 
a haltw~--if not an entirely--revolutionary epoch in American history. 
2lIndeed, Leuchtenburg, "New Deal and Analogue," pp. 142-43, 
cogently argues that the entire New Deal rested upon the analogy of 
World War I. He contends that the very need for and us age of the war 
experience as an exmmple for action reveals both a weak tradition of 
reform and a reluctance of the American people to recognize and accept 
the growth and the power of the federal government. 
22.rb.is is based upon a random sampling of texts. Those which fall 
into the first category include: John M. Blum, et al.,. The National 
erience: A History. of the Un!ted States (3rd ed.; New York: Harcourt 
~race Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 633-34, 640; Richard N•.Current, T. Harry 
'Williams, and Frank Freidel, American History: A Survey (3rd ed.: New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf~ 1971), pp. 643-644; Carl N. Degler, et al., The 
Democratic Experience: A Short American History, Vol. II (3rd ed.: -
Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973), pp. 211-12, 
215; Forrest McDonald, Leslie E. Decker, and Thomas' P. Govan, The Last 
Best Ho e: A Histo of the United States, Part 3 (Reading Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1972 , pp. 836, 844; and Samuel 
Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager, and William E. Leuchtenburg, 
The Growth of the American Re~ublic, Vol. II (6th ed.; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1969),.pp.94-97. Texts which come under the second 
J 
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Arguments between historical camps regarding the NRA roughly follow' 

the same lines of interpretation of the New Deal. 

Historians are in general agreement that the NRA was basically 
a failure for the economy as a whole. They are also in agreement that 
the NRA trie~ to do too_much at once in order to be a really effective 
stimuluS toward recovery. They argue that NRA policy came to be domi­
nated by big business, while the worker, the small businessman, and 
the consumer were left out in the cold. Disagreements arise over 
whether the NRA was conservative or revolutionary in nature, or 
whether it was both. Perhaps the most proper interpretation--if 
indeed an interpretation may ever be "proper"--of the NRA should be 
that it was both conservative and revolutionary at the same time. The 
NRA t s conservatism lay in its stated goal: to bring about recovery to 
what had been in existence before 1929. Its main attribute of radical­
ism was its foray into the world of private enterprise during peacetime. 
category include: Peter N. Carroll and David W. Noble, The Restless 
Centuries: A Histo of the American Pea le (M~inneapolis: Burgess 
Pu'blish~ng Company, 1973 , pp. 30- 31; John A. Garraty, A Short History 
of the American Nation (New York: Harper & Row., 1974), pp. 420, 242, 
429; Richard Hofstadter, vlilliam l.fi.ller, and Daniel Aaron, The United 
States:· The History of a Re1ublic (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,1967, pp. 717-19,725-26,728-29; and Edwin·C. 
Rozwenc, The Makin of American Societ: An Institutional and 
.Intellectual History of the United States, Vol. II Boston: Allyn 
. and Bacon, 1973), pp. 350-53, 361-62, 366, 369, 373. 
From New Era Through New 
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Taken as a whole, there is a relatively abundant amount of pub­
lished historical writing available which discusses the NRA. However, 
much of it has very specific limitations. 
MOst of the material which has been written on the NRA must 
be gleened from monographs which discuss, among other things, the 
economic aspects of the Roosevelt· era, or labor in the 1930's, or 
Roosevelt himself, or the New Deal in general. The number of scholarly 
articles which discuss the NRA within the broad conceptual framework 
of the New Deal are in an almost infinite supply. However, articles' 
published within the last fifteen years which deal specifically with 
the NRA, or some aspect of it, are not plentiful. The bulk of pub­
lished material. dealing with the NRA consists of articles appearing 
in both "popular" and scholarly periodicals, book-length surveys, and 
government-sponsored analyses--all of which were written during the 
short lifespan of the NRA or not long ,afterward. As the economic 
historian Broadus Mitchell commented in 1947: tiThe National Industrial 
Recovery Act and the National Recovery Administration left a large 
literature of description, praise, and dispraise.,,23 And most of this 
literature borders upon the fine line between classification as either 
, 24 
primary or secondary source material. 
23Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade: 
Deal, 1929-1941 (New York: Harper &Row, 19" 
24In relatively recent articles and monographs which discuss the 
NRA, authors rely heavily upon the CongreSSional Record and various 
Congressional committee reports: the Darrow report; Johnson, The 
Blue Eagle; Lyon, et al., The National Recovery Administration; and 
Roos, NRA Economic Planning, is the most frequently cited source; how­
ever, besides being published in 1937, it also has fairly skimpy 
documentation. 
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The complete records of the NRA are contained in the National 
Archives (Record Group 9),; in microfilm form the records take up 186 
rolls which are cataloged by industry. Thus, it is almost, if not 
entirely, impossible to examine the full records of the NRA. 
As a result of the sheer size of the official NRA records, 
historians have to pick' and choose what they research while also 
having to determine how deeply they are willing and able to delve into 
the history of the NRA.· Therefore, the reader is presented with either 
very broad overviews of the NRA or with very narrov and specific vievs 
of it. To this writer's knowledge, no published state studies of the 
NRA exist. The NRA in itself is dealt with little in conjunction to 
the New Deal in the states. One unpublished work, a Reed College 
Senior Thesis which was written in 1934, touches upon 'the NRA in Oregon 
with emphasis upon the lumber industry, the primary industry of the 
25state.
The present study will attempt to plow some fertile soil in 
state stUdies of the New Deal by examining the NRA in Oregon. James T. 
Patterson connnents that there is aft,••• great amount of work which 
~ profitably be begun in the field of state history • • • " in the 
history of the New Deal. 26 It is hoped tha~ this thesis will offer
, , 
a contribution to the history of Oregon and the NRA. 
25Francis Clare Vause, "The Administration of the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act with Particular Reference to the Lumber Industry" 
(unpublished Senior thesis, Reed College, June 1934). 
26James R. Pattersori, The New Deal and the States: Federalism in 
Transition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), 
p. 218. 
1 
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Oregon duri~g the 1930"5 may not be termed either a typical or 
an atypical state in comparison to the other forty-seven states; 
obviously, every state possesses unique chara.cteristics. But an exam­
ination of the NRA on the state level, using Oregon as a te~t case, 
should prove useful as' more of a grassroots view of the NRA than the 
broad national or the very specific approaches which are currently 
given it by historians. 
Historians are. in accord as to how the NRA o~erated on the 
national level and how the American people reacted to it. The general 
objective of this paper is to answer the question: Does Oregon's 
response to.the NRA follow the response of the nation? 
J . 

CHAPTER II 
OREGON AND THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 
"Let's Make the Blue Eagle Scream!" 
Hugh Johnson, during a meeting in mid-July of 1933, was in a 
quandary over hoy to. arouse national support for the NRA. World \far I, 
he said, had been less real for most' Americans than the Depression. 
He declared that "tAlmost every individual has either suffered terribly, 
or knows of friends and relatives who have; so there is wa!ting here 
to be appealed to what I regard as the most fertile psychology that 
you could imagine. • • • I think this has anything that happened dur­
ing the War backed off the board. t .~l Not long after this meeting, the 
President's Reemployment ~reement was initiated by Johnson. 
Before the PRA in the late summer of 1933, the reality of the 
NRA in Oregon was practically nonexistent for business, for labor, 
and especially for the public. Bus~ness knew that it would be governed 
in its practices by the government, but· very few NRA codes had be.en 
written before the PRA became effective "that had any impact upon 
Oregon's business community. A similar uncertainty existed for labor. 
For the Oregon public the NRA was a mysterious federal agency which 
promised to speed recovery from the Depression. 
lSpecial Industrial Recovery Board, Proceedings, July 18, 19, 
1933; quoted in Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 113. 
" ,/ 
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Oregonians vaguely grasped the NRA as an essential part of 
~oosevelt's New Deal~ but had little idea of how it would actually 
influence their everyiJ.q lives. Although the NRA, like the New Deal 
in general, interested almost evel7'one, it is questionable w:hethe'r 
very' many people really understood just exactly how the NBA was to be 
their economic salvation. The NRA, like most newly-created governmental 
bureaucracies--particularly before the rise of mass media--was under­
stood little by grassroots America. Even today it ,is dubious whether 
federal bureaucracies are understood by many people. With the beginning 
, , 
of the PRA and the 'Blue Eagle drive, the MBA became a reality for 
Oregonians. ' 
Edgar Freed~ a Portland attorney, was appointed General in 
charge of the metropolitan area Blue Eagle drive. Freed later became 
the State Director of the URA and eventually State Director of the 
National Emergency Council '(NEC). A Phi Beta Kappa from Harvard 
Law School who had s~rved as an officer in the Army during World War I~ 
Freed had a number of "officers tl with military titles working under 
him in an effort to coordinate the Blue Eagle campaign. He made the, 
PRA, and the NBA directly analogous to w~ when he said that: 
This is a war. It' will be conducted ",ith the same organization 
used in war. Every resident of Portla.nd~ either directly 
or indirectly, will be affected by the mobilization of these 
soldiers. 2 
2oregonian, Aug. ~~ 1933, p. 1. 
,or ..---... V 
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Freed t S It soldiersn came in every shape and form; they were troops vhi ch 
brought Portland to a temper which bordered upon mass hysteria. 
The first troops of the Blue Eagle drive to assemble were Port­
l.and's businessmen when, on July 27, over 4.,0003 Portland employers 
jammed the public auditorium and pledged themselves- to sign and uphold 
the PHA. While Boy Scouts circulated preliminary PHA sheets for 
signatures, businessmen listened to Governor Julius L. Meier, Amedee M. 
Smith, the Portland Chamber of Commercets president, and Walter W.. R. 
May, the Chamber's manager, speak of the high purpose of the NRA and 
ot the bUsinessmen ',s patriotism. With a great deal of commotion and 
boosteri~m, those present approved of appointing a vigilante committee 
ot one hundred to check on "slackers" and s-poke confidently of prosperity 
being at their doorstep. The meeting kicked off the Blue Eagle drive 
in Portland. It now became impossible for anyone to ignore the Blue 
Eagle, for the symbol appeared everywhere one went and upon almost 
everything one saw. 
Newspapers carried scores of adver1;.isements using the Blue Eagle 
and the slogan, "vTe Do Our Part." The ads coupled the hope of prosperity 
to be achieved through the Blue Eagle with the bargains to be found in 
the stores which were a~vertising. A prime example of this sort of 
advertisement was placed by the Portland retailers Olds,_ Wortman &King 
in the Oregon Labor Press in early September: 
3stat1stics cited in this chapter which are drawn from newspaper 

accounts are probably inflated. These figures were, nevertheless, what 

the reading public was presented with at the time. 

-il' 
j 
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Good Times ARE Coming Back 
The National Recovery Administration is in full swing and 

ever,ywhere is evidenced the effects of the Blue Eagle. 

Olds, Wortman & King is happy to have a part in this forward 

march to real prosperity--bringing you greater and greater 
values for your money. 
Qnward America! Onward Oregon! Let's Go!4 
However,. not every advertisement incorporated the Blue Eagle with an 
effort to sell something, as evidenced by the following ad by the 
Oregonian which uses boosterism--and the analogy to war: 
Let's follow the Blue Eagle! Just as Liberty Bonds won 

the w~r in '18, so the Blue Eagle. can lead us .to victory 

over depression today • • • 

Let's make the Blue Eagle scream!.5 
But not only did newspapers 'contain scores upon scores of advertisements 
which used the Blue Eagle, they also carried lists of employers who 
signed the PRA--lists which typically occupied over three full columns 
of newsprint. 6, 
FHA applications from Oregon and Idaho--Idaho comprised a NRA 
district with Oregon in 1933--flooded into the Portland headquarters of 
the Blue Eagle drive at the rate of two to three hundred a day. By 
late August, 24,869 em.!'-l.oyers and 95,478 workers from Oregon and Idaho 
had signed the PRA. By late September, 31,151 employer applications 
40regon Labor Press, Sept. 1, 1933, p. 7. 

50regortian, Sept. 1.8, 1933, p. 3. 

6For example, see the'Oregonian, July 30, p. 12, July 31, p.' 4, 

Aug. 2, p. 4, 1933. 
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for the PRA, of which approximately two-thirds were from Oregon, had 
come to Blue Eagle drive offices. T, In Portland, less than one percent 
or around 12,000 metropolitan area employers were without a Blue 
Eagle in early September.8 
The Portland-area consumer was also a part of the Blue Eagle 
troops. Five hundred distribution points--booths in banks, large ret~i'l . 
stores, and all of Portland's three hundred gas stations--were set up 
to encourage Portlanders to sign PRA consumer pledge cards and to give 
away Blue Eagle window and windshield stickers. By late September, , 
over ninety-five percent of the city's homes had signed the consumers' 
pledge. Approximately 298,400 Portlanders had signed the pledge.9 
The enthusiastic boosterism and hoopla of the l~te summer and 
early 	fall cli'maxed on October 5, when Portland held a Northwest mayors I 
conference in the afternoon and hosted a Blue Eagle parade in ~he 
evening. Civic activities began at two in the afternoon and ended some 
nine hours later. IO 
Portland Mayor Joseph K. Carson met with eighteen Northwest mayors 
from cities as far away as Seattle, Tacoma., Medford, and Seaside as 
70regonian, Aug. 20, p. 12, Aug. ,27, p. 6, Sept. 22, 1933, 
p. 	7. 
Boregon'Journai, Sept. 6,1933, p. 1. 
90regon Journal, Sept. 6, 1933, p. 1; Oregonian, Sept. 24, 1933, 
p. 9. 
laThe following section on the Portland NRA celebration is taken 

trom the Oregonian, Oct. 6, 1933, pp. 1, 4, 6. 

l 
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well as those from nearby Vancouver, Camas, Troutdale and Oregon City 
at the Portland Chamber of Commerce in the early afternoon. Every 
mayor present considered the NRA as basically a success and encouraged' 
cooperation by the nation's leaders so that the rest of the New Deal's 
program might proceed rapidly. 
Later the dignitaries and between l25,000 ,and 150,000 spectators 
Who crowded the streets cheered as paraders, variously estimated at 
from 42,000 to 75,000 in number, marched to the tune of "Happy Days 
Are Here Again" for over three and a half hours in balmy Indian Summer 
weather. SchOOl children--who numbered somewhere between 8,000 and 
12,000 and who comprised the largest single group in Portland's lifRA 
parade--carried a sign which read "America Must Have Educated Citizens 
for the NRA. It "Old Man Depression" met his doom under a chugging 
steamroller. Civilian Conservation Corps troops marched with'axes, 
shovels, and picks swung over their bare shoulders. The Oregonian 
approvin.gly commented that "Enthusiasm ran high and free ••• Every­
one felt that it 'was a march to prosperity••••,,11 Walter W. R. 
May, manager of the Portland Chamber of Commerce, boasted that "This 
parade is the largest NRA march held in the United States, with the 
exception of that in New York city[sic]. "12 ,In sheer numbers, 
the parade was the largest in Portland's history, with more people 
turning out to cheer the Blue Eagle than had previously cheered Charles 
Lindberg, or Theodore Roosevelt, or Woodrow Wilson. 
110regonian, Oct. y, 1933, p. 1. 

12 4 ' 

, Oresonian, Oct. 6, 1933, p. • 
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Orego~ians had made the Blue Eagle scream, and the ~lRA had become 
a. reality; prosperity, however, had no1; returned. The Blue Eagle 
drive helped to convince Oregonians that they could march stra.ight out, 
ot the Depression. But, unfortunately, the Depression did not end for 
Oregon on October 5. 
Atter the exc!tement of Portland's NRA pa.rade, public interest 
in the NRA--at least as measured by pa.triotic a.ppeals for support of 
1t--dec1iried noticeably. Retail busi'neeses still displayed the Blue 
Eagle in their advertising, but nothing appeared in newspapers which 
, came close to pre-parade advertisements. The Blue, Eagle symbol became 
a proforma of display for businesses; effusive rhetoric in support of 
the BRA disappeared from virtually all advertisements. 
The BRA had slipped to a position of being a half-reality for the 
Oregon public 'by late 1933. Almost like that ever-elusive prosperity 
that had been lost in the early thirties, so too the emotionalism, 
positivism, and boosterism of Oregonians for the NRA dwindled. 
The Business Community and the NRA 
Oregon's business community cannot be treated as a single unit 
when dealing with its response to the NRA. Both the size and the 
location of a business were determining factors in the state's business 
sector and its response to the NRA. 
Small service estab1ishments--businesses employing five 'or less 
persons--10cated in towns of less than 2,500 population and not in a 
metropolitan area were exempt from obligations under the PRA; this 
exemption was continued with regard ~o NRA code provisions. A large 
~________________~__________~______~7 
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portion of Oregonis business community can be excluded from the dis­
cussion, since--1ike most Western states--the bulk of the population 
13lived in towns of less than 2,500 not in a metropolitan area. Most 
businesses in small communities were probably service establishments 
that were family operated and that employed less than five people--gas 
stations, dry goods stores, and grocery stores are perhaps the best 
examples. 
The location of a business establishment in Oregon limited the 
business community's response to the NRA. The organization of the 
state offices of the NRA prohibited much c9ntact with towns and cities 
not within the Portland metropolitan area. A field adjustor was appointed 
in March of 1934, but most of his time was spent in the Portland office. 
And Edgar Freed made no effort to organi~e local adjustment agencies. 
The majority of complaints to come into the state office came from 
the Portland area, probably because of the lack of facilities for 
dealing with c~mplaints elsewhere in the state.14 
Once it is taken into consideration that both size and location 
of businesses determine, to a large degree, a discussion of the business 
sector's response to the NRA, it is a logical conclusion to deal almost 
exclusively with the Portland area business community.15 Consequently, 
13In 1930, twenty-two communities in Oregon had a population of 
2,500-10,000; six cities had populations of over 10,000. U. S., Depart­
ment of Commerce,Bureau of the'Census, Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930: Population, III, 629, 630. 
l4Vause, "Administration of the NIRA," p. 67. 
l5whi1e there were twenty-seven towns or cities, besides Portland, 
which had populations of over 2,500 in 1930, the majority of them were 
not within easy driving distance--50 mi1es~-of Portland. 
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the following discussion will focus mainly upon the state's large~t 
city. 
Arter the excitement of the Blue Eagle campaign died down, the 
business commlmity of Portland continued to displ~ its Blue Eagle 
placards and to incorpora.te the Blue Eagle "We Do Our Partn emblem 
and slogan in its advertising. But gone forever was the boosterism of 
the late summer and early fall of 1933. Although busin~ss did not ignore 
the NRA, it is questionable whether business really supported it. 
It is doubtful whether any business during the thirties was willing 
to support a program which forced it to limi~ production, raise prices, 
pay its employees a minimum wage, and not work its employees over a 
maximum number of hours. That the NRA was federal law and not a 
voluntary program points to what must have been e~ther an unwilling­
ness on the part of a greater portion of Am~rican business to accept the 
BRA or a dubious attitude on the part of government that business would 
respond unfa.vorably to the NRA. More than anything else, businesses' 
use of the Blue Eagle in advertising can probably be counted toward 
good public relations. 
Whether the Blue Eagle was actually effective as a public rela­
tions device depended'upon the area in which a business was located 
and the type of clientele to which it catered. The Cresent Laundry, which 
was located in a predominantly working-class and lower-class district 
of East Portland, suffered no loss in business after its Blue Eagle 
was removed for violation of Section 1(a) and price cutting.16 But 
l6~, March 9, 1934, p. 1. 
j' 
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other businesses in more well-to-do areas of Portland which lost the'ir 
Blue Eagles eit~er went out of business or struggled to st~y in 
17
'business because of adverse public sentiment. Meier &Frank~ a 
prominent downtown Portland retail store, was the most vigorous user 
of the Blue Eagle as an advertising aid t It even had. a "Blue Eagle 
Dq Sales" promotion in November of 1934 during which it ga.ve away NRA 
consumer pledge window stickers and used advertisements like the following: 
Much stress is properly laid on the importance of the 'consumers 
co-operation t in the NRA program, and Meier & Frank., through 
its Blue Eagle Sale, rewards the consumer for this co-operation 
in a most practical way ••• good money saved on good goods .' •• 
wanted thin~s, needed things, things for person, for home, 
for gifts. l . 
To a large degree, it depended upon where a business was situated and 
to whom it catered as to what would happen to its patronage if it lost 
its Blue Eagle. 
One particular incident in Portland merits notice when discuss-
lug the NRA and business. The owner of a business voluntarily 
surrendered his Blue Eagle in December of 1933 because of what he 
publically termed the ttoutr~eousft pric~s that he had to charge 
his customers according to code , provisions. L. L. Starr, proprie~ot. 
of the Portland Cleaning Works, insisted that he was paying his forty-
three employees over the wage scale set by the NRA while also staying 
17Vause , "Administration or the NlRA," pp. 22-23; Oregonian, 

March 15, 1934, p. 1; OLP, April 6, p. 1, Sept. 28, 1934, p. 1. 

18Oregonian~ Nov. 18, 1934, p. 13. 
~ 
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under maximum hour guidelines'. He stated that he would not 11 gouge . 
the public" by charging the Portland code prices which were formulated 
and accepted by twenty-four out of' a total of 300 Portland cleaners. 
Starr--who said that other owners were also dissatisfied with the' 
code-maintained that he was in sympathy wi t~ the NRA; but he felt that 
it he charged the code. price for his services, he would be forced to 
l~ orf halr his workers because the public would not patronize his 
establishment at suc~ high prices.19 But Starr's public statements do 
not tell of the entire story behind his giving up of the Blue Eagle. 
Starr's relat'ionship with Edgar Freed was not the best. Starr 
privately commented that ttlf he [Freed] had treated me respectably and 
in the proper light , it would have been entirely different." ]?enolL.'"lcing 
Freed 1n no uncertain terms for his offensive attitude and general 
incompetence, Starr stated that ttMr. [Frank] Messenger [Executive ' 
Assistant of the Oregon NRA] is a gentleman • • • I do not doubt that 
it Mr. Messenger had been in charge of the office this thing could have 
been cleared up.tt20 Starr was obviously. biased, since he did forfeit 
his Blue Eagle, but even while statements like his might be discounteq., 
they certainly cannot be ignored. Starr was alone, perhaps, in his 
190regonian, Dec. 19, 1933, p. 7. It is inter~sting to note that 
the publicity of Starr's action attracte~ rather than repelled, customers; 
Vause, "Administration of the NlRA,n p. 133. 
2°Quoted in Vause, "Administration qf the NIRA," p. 60. Frank 
~ssenger had been district compliance director for Oregon and Idaho 
before the NRA Compliance Division was reorganized along state lines 
in early 1934. 
..... 
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recorded verbal abuse of Freed; however, he was not alone in the Oregon 
business community in being dissatisfied with NRA codes. 
Lumber industry officials basically supported the NRA in their 
public statements. Colonel William B. Greely, who vas Chief Forester 
ot the United States before becondng Secretary-Manager of the West 
Coast Lumbermen t s Association, commented' at a me.eting held in Portland 
ot the Northern Pacific Section of the Society of American Foresters 
that: "The national lumber code is functioning satisfa.ctorily. • • • 
Two results already are outstanding. These are production control and 
establishment of cost production prices. ,,21. But t~e general sentiment 
. . 22 
of Oregon's lumber industry towards ·NRA codes was one of discontent. 
Lumber mill operators as a group were not pleased with the NRA 
lumber codes under which they operated, especially regarding prices. 
A general beliet in the lumber industry vas that minimum retail prices 
under the lumber code were too high for the market. Lumbermen believed 
that retail code prices for their products vere in fact so high that new 
building was prohibited. Ben H. Hazen, President of the Oregon Savings 
and Loan League, shared this belief. Most certainly, code prices were 
too high for the· lumber industry of the Northwest to compete in the 
21oregonian, March 15, 1934~ p. 6. 
2~e following section on the response of Oregon's lumber industry 
to the NRA is derived for the most part from Va.use, "Administration of 
the HIRA," chap. 4, "The NRA in the Lumber Industry." Only direct quota­
tions will be cited. Vause relied heavily upon personal interviews with 
and private-letters from lumber industry personnel in the compilation 
ot this particular chapter of his thesis. Inquiries were sent to small, 
medium and large lumber mill operators; however, only one of the replies 
from large operators discussed the questions which were put to them by 
Vause: 
i. 
1 
I i 
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world market. The Northwest was exporting three times as much lumber 
as British Columbia in the 1920's, but by the early thirties it was 
exporting one third as much as British Columbia. 
Smal1 back-woods operators--who were typically a very independent 
group and who were accustomed to a "hip pocket" form of bookkeeping-­
simp1y did not understand what the NRA was or how it wa.s to help them. 
One back-woods operator wrote that: 
The code authority seems to me to "be verry [sic] strict and 
they pester me with a lot of literature tha.t I don't under­
stand and they don't answer the questions I ask them when I 
write to them. Really I don't think the small mills are 
getting a fair deal. 23 
To many sma11 operators, the NRA appeared to be nothing more than a 
tederal bureaucracy which was incomprehensible both in its means and 
ends. As one operator said, tI ••• theres [sic] entirely to [sic] 
much code literature to try to read it all. • • • ..24 
Many 1umber mi11s used price n chise1ingn as an alternative to 
losing business because of the prices they were supposed to charge 
their customers. Operating in a fashion reminiscent of the bootleggers 
of the 1920 t s, lumber mills lowered their lumber a grade or two and 
so1d it for the code price of lesser qua1ity lumber or sold their 
product on account at the code price and accept a percentage of that 
billing as full p~nt. One lumberman remarked that "'Ninety percent 
ot the industry lay [sic] awake nights thinking of ways to chisel. 1',25 
Every 1umberman seemed to be ab1e to suggest ways of beating the code. 
23Vause, "Administ~ation of the NlRA," p. 112. 
24Vause , nAdministratio~ of the NlRA," supplement, n.p. 
25Vause , nAdministration of the NlRA," p. 94. 
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Commenting upon the lumber code, Colonel William B. Greeley 
privateJ.y admi t ted tha.t "'. • • there are a lot of lumbermen who would 
like to see the whole thing kicked into a cocked hat.,n26 And much to 
the delight of most lumbermen, the NRA did suspend code price provisions­
the mOst annoying aspect of the lumber code--on December 22, 1934. 
Chiseling on Section 7(a) of the NlRA was a relatively easy 
matter for the lumber industry. The fear of unemployment was a mighty 
tool used by lumber operators over their employees. Workers had to report 
violations of Section 7(a) in'order for compliance to occur; but when 
employers told their workers that fl ••• they had better keep their 
mouths shut or they would all get fired • • • ," it is doubttul that 
many workers would complain.27 Outside the Portland area, the NRA was 
not a great stimulus to unionism in Ore~6n's lumber industry. 
After the NRA was declared unconsti tutional in May of 1935, many 
Portland-area businessmen at first stated that they would continue the 
spirit of the NRA locally by maintaining their present wage and hour 
scales. A survey, conducted by the Oregonian on June 1, 1935, among 
fourteen different types of business in Portland, found ffa practically 
unanimous11 agreement among executives that: 11 'We have made no changes 
ion wages or hours. ,1128 The Oregon Labor Press commented that ". • • we 
26Vause , "Administration of the NlRA,tt p. 119. 

27Vause, "Administration of the NlRA," p. 131. 

28sun<!!t Oregonian, June 2, 1935, p. 1. 
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have found the c()nsensus of opinion to be in favor of voluntarily 
continuing NRA fair trade practices, code wages and maximum hours. ,,29 
But their attitudes and actions gradually began to change. By 
September of 1935, the spirit of the NRA was s for all practical. pur­
poses, nonexistent in Oregon. A trend towards increasing hours, 
lovering wages, and cu~ting prices had begun in Jl.Ule of 1935 and from 
July through August 15 s it vs.s,reported that 133 Oregon firms had 
ignored what previously had been their guidelines on operation--~f.RA 
codes. 30 Although this vas a very s~ sample ,of the entire business 
community of Oregon, it is likely that this report wa.s indicative of 
a mass movement among businessmen away from NRA concepts and'towards 
free-market competitive ideals. 
ObViously, it is impossible to offer a blw~et assessment of the 
response of Oregon's business community to the NRA. The lumber industry, 
the state's largest industry, was generally antagonistic to the NRA. 
The attitudes of retail firms', however, varied, depending upon size, 
location. and clientele. Thus, it cannot be said that ,the business 
community responded in any kind of united action or like fashion 
towards the NRA. 
Organiied Labor and the NRA:, A Case of Pragmatic 'Enthusiasm 
The pragmatic enthusiasm of organized labor for Section 7(a) 
of the NIRA, vas voiced emphatically by ,the weekly Oregon Labor Press., 
"The Official Publication of the Central Labor Council of Portland 
300regonian, Sept. 2, 1935, p. 1. 
" 

35 

and Vicinity and the Oregon State Federation of La.bor." The Q.hl: 
told its readers that' "The government of the United States has estab­
lished your legal right to organize! It 31 But it also warned its readers 
that: 
Labor will either organize, OR IT WILL BE HERDED. • • • It 
is not up to General Johnson to tell ,labor or employers whether 
he is organi~irtg .. them or not. IT IS UP TO LABOR TO ORGANIZE. 
• • • The government is helping industry to organize.. Labor 
has to do its job itself, as it should•••• THE THING TO 
DO TODAY IS TO FORM UNIONS EVERY1affiERE. EVERY AMERICAN WORKER 
OUGHT TO BE IN A UNION.32 
The Q.hl: voiced this rather guarded support for the NRA a number of 
times. 33 
Oregon's AFL officials were keenly aware of the fact that workers 
would gain only those benefits for which they fought. Shortly after 
the act became law, the ~ worried because labor was not included 
in the formation of NRA codes. 34 Ben T.-Osborne, Executive Secretary-
Treasurer of the Oregon State AFL, took a realistic view of the NIRA 
when he commented in his Annual Report that tiThe recovery act will 
either prove to be the greatest blessing or the greatest curse which 
bas come to organized labor in all its history in this nation.,,35 
31oLP, June 30, 1933, p. 1. 

32Ed1torial, OLP, July 28, 1933, p. 2. 

330LP , June 16, p. 1, Sept. 22, p. 3, 1933·; Editorial, June 16, 

p. 2, June 30, p. 2, July 21, p. 2, Aug. 11, p. 3, Aug. 25, p. 3. 
Sept. 1, p. ~, 1933, March 9, p. 2, 1934. 
34Editoria1., ~, July 14, 1933, p. 2. 

350LP, Aug. 11, 1933, p. 4. 
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While Section 7(a) was a valuable piece of legislation for the turther­
ance of the goals of organized labor, it was only worth as much as 
was demanded under its guidelines. 
Both the efforts of labor organizers and the realization by the 
unorganized worker that unionism was indeed feasible under Section 7(a) 
led to a great upsurge in labor activity and labor organization in Oregon, 
particularly in the Portland area. Especially active were longshoremen, 
butchers, municipal ~ployees, barbers, retail clerks, laundry workers, 
furniture workers, textile workers, loggers, and sawmill workers. By 
late AuguSt of 1933,~ 3,000 new members were adp.ed to Portland AFL locals, 
of whi ch about one-third were longshoremen and another third were s.aw­
mill and timber workers. In the latter half of 1933, twenty-five 
~ unions were organized in the Portland area alone. The following 
year an additional twenty ~ unions were a.dded to the Portland AFL 
rollcall. 36 Gust Anderson,'Secrete.ry of the Central Labor Council of 
Portland, commented g10wingly in the early tall of 1935 'that "Since 
the enactment of the National Recovery Act to the present time, the 
membership in Portland has almost doubled and organized labor is g:row­
. , 
ing by leaps and bounds.tt~1 Labor did fight for its rights under 
Section 7(a), and to a large degree it ,did gain the benefits it sought. 
But its rights were not al~s easily won, for there wa.s definitely 
less than a compatib1e relationship in existence between labor and 
Or~gon's elected. officials during the 1930's. 
~ 4 .~, Aug. 25~ 1933, p. 1, Jan. , 1935, p. 1. 

370LP~ Sept. 6~ 1935, sec. 2, p. 4. 
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The Oregon Labor Press referred to Governor Julius L. Meier, of 
the Portland retail firm of Meier & Frank, as If. • Oregon's pri ze• 
dumbbell governor •••"38 Union officials knew that Meier held a 
mutually unfriendly opinion of labor. He alienated workers badly by 
calling out the State Militia in July 1934 to assist strike breakers in 
crossing pi~ket .lines during the bitter Portland longshore strike. 
Lasting through the spring and summer the affair was probably the most 
dra.matic strike that Portland, or Oregon, ha.s ever witnessed. Meier 
was not alone in his actions against striking longshoremen. Portl~d's 
mayor, Joseph Carson--who was typically termed by labor as • anfl. • 
overgrown kid that, is trying to fill a he-man job •••,,32-called out 
500 regular and special policemen in late June to patrol the waterfront. 
In add!tion, Martin T. Pratt, Multnoln!lh County Sheriff, had a contingent 
of his deputies on the docks. The Oregon AFL responded by passing 
a resolution which condemned their use of force--strikers were eventually 
fired upon with four injuries occurring--during the longshore strike. 40 
The relationship between Governor Charles H. Martin, who took 
oftice in January of 1935, and organized labor was, to say the least, 
strained. Martin,·a Democrat and a retired Army Major-General who 
was referred to as "Tin Pants Martin" by many Oregonians, delighted 
in antagonizing labor. Martin's solution, which he suggested to the 
380LP , Jan. 1, 1934, p. 2. 

390LP, Oct. 4. 1935, p. 1. 

400LP , Aug. 31, 1934, p. 1. 
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sheriffs of the state., for dealing with labor organizers---whom '.he called 
"pestiferous peewees,,4l_-and strikers was to tt ••• bea.t hell out of 
•eml • • .• " and to "Crack their damn heads I Those fellows are there 
for nothing but trouble--give it to theml" If strike situations ever 
looked as if they might get out of hand, he noted that "We have thirty­
ti~e hundred nationa.l guardsmen in the State, and each of them knows, 
how to use a rifle! ,,42 Martin was mo~e than willing' to heed his own 
advice during labor disturbances--a fact which drew no mean amount of 
wrath from the union spokesmen who claimed that he was merely If. • • run-
Ding true to form • • • If when he called ow; armed forces to combat 
43
strikers. 
Organized labor had almost as much bureaucratic difficulty with 
,the state offices of the NRA as it had pr~blems with Oregon's officials. 
Before the NRA had been in existence for" even six months, it was noted 
that "Complaints to NRA get exactly nowhere at present. They may be 
changed. But that's how it is today. You can complain and get in 
return a nice form letter.,,44 When labor's complaints 'Were decided upon 
by the state office, decisions typically went in favor of management. 
The main complaint registered by labor 'Was that Edgar Fr~ed had no 
, 41Letter, Charles H. Martin to Walter E. Pearson, May 16, 1935, 
Oregon Historical Society Manuscript Collection, Charles H. Martin 
Papers. 
42Quoted in Richard L. Nueberger, Our Promised Land (Uew York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 315. 
430LP, June 14, 1935, 'p. 1. 
44 ~, Oct. 20, 1933, p. 1. 
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sympat~ for the position of labor. Labor officials even had trouble 
in just seeing Freed. 45 The Portland labor organizations were evidently 
the only ones who r~ceived much attentton in the state director's office. 
The Salem Trades and Labor Council once complained that: 
The NRA staff in Portland • • • has no ti,me for Salem. Com­
plaints receive no attention when they come from Salem. Port-­
'land, the so-called metropolis, has hogged the services of the 
BRA staff just as it hogs everything else • • • all Salem gets 
is a nice large goose egg. This is got a recent development,4but has been a permanent condition. 
There is little doubt that the labor policies of the state office of 
the NRA, when combined with the vacillating labor policy of Hugh 
Johnson, led to a considerable amount of disappointment and frustration 
on the part of organized labor in Oregon. 
The Oregon Labor Press devoted little space--e~torial or 
otherwise--to"the demise of the NRA. Almost all attention, in the 
spring and summer of 1935, was turned to the National Labor Re~ations 
Act, or Wagner Act, whi ch was an offspring of Section 7 of the NIRA. 
But organized labor was, nevertheless, J?ot ha.ppy with the Supreme 
Court decision which struck down the BRA. As the Oregon Labor Press 
explained, the judges t ruling caused working men and women to feel "that 
they are without the protection of the Federal Constitution in the 
4 ­
field of industrial relations." 7 Als~ regrettable to organized labor 
vas the tI ••• inevitable resumption of child labor exploitation 
45Vause, "Administration of the NIRA," p. 59. 
46 . ~, March 2, 1934, p. 4. 

47Ed!torial, 2!!t, July 19, 1935, p. 3. 
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48by antisocial employers." However, even though the lIRA and Section 
7(a) were gone, the NRA ha.d given labor a much needed boost. Organiza­
t10n within labor had increased and workers were fairly confident that 
• 4~
at least they had a foothold in the f~eld of labor relations •. 
4~ditorial, ~, June 14, 1935, p. 3. 
49Editorial, ~, June 21, 1935, p. 3.' 
-J 
CHAPTER III 
OREGON, THE NATION .AND THE BLUE EAGLE: 

COMPARISONS AND CQNTRASTS 

The response of Oregon to the NRA roughly paralleled the response 
nation-wide. Neither the public, the business community, nar labor in 
Oregon differed seriously from their counterparts in other states • 
.Furthermore, the op~rations, and even the problems, of the NRA I s office 
in Oregon were similar to those of the NRA headquarters in Washington. 
Interesting comparisons and contrasts can be drawn between Edgar 
Freed, head of the NRA in Oregon, and Hugh Johnson, national director 
of the NRA. Both had been officers in the ~ and both viewed the 
Blue Eagle drive as something of a. military. operation. Johnson had an 
enthusiasm for his job that is characterized by one historian as 
It the frontier abandon of a boy raised in the Cherokee Strip...1 
Freed, however, spent most of his time in his law firm, away from the 
state NRA offices. 2 Both Johnson and Freed drew the wrath of labor 
upon themselves, but in different wqs. Johnson antagonized labor by' 
paying too much attention to it; he continually and unnecessarily 
lLeuchtenburg, FDR and the Ney Deal, p. 65. 
2Vause, "Administration of the NIRA," p. 58. Most· of the informa­
tion in this section on Freed is taken from Va.use, pp. 58-63. Vause 
worked around the state NRA offices for a. period of months researching 
his thesis. 
. ! 
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intervenes in labor disputes, sometimes without the authority to do 
so in the first place. Freed angered labor' by virtually ignoring it; 
he felt tha.t the complaints of workers were not "'bus1ness-like.,n3 
Jo~~son was available to see almost anyone without an appointment. 
Freed vas very exclusive in who he saw at his NRA office--he saw people 
by appointment only--and those people he did meet with were typically 
prominent businessmen and politicians. In late 1933 and early '1934 
Francis Clare Vause, a Reed College senior, spent a great deal· of time 
in the offices of the state NRA while working on his thesis. During. 
this time he was never granteQ. an interview vith Freed. 
Johnson. and Freed also had similar relationships with their chief 
assistants, Donald R. Richberg and Frank Messenger. Just as Johnson 
and Richberg.were almost constantly at odds with one another, Freed and 
Messenger never got along very well.' Messenger, who had been district 
compliance director before the Compliance Division of the NRA was 
reorganized along state lines in early 1934, was openly resentful of 
his demotion to executive assistant to Freed. An eyewitness ~o Messenger 
and Freed's relationship commented that "they dislike ~ach other heartily 
and there is friction at every turn. A number of open flares have 
occurred. ,,4 Messenger was eventually transferred to Seattle as trade 
compliance officer. C. Laird McKenna, a Portland attorney, who had been 
legal advisor to Messenger and who later became legal advisor ~o Freed, 
3Vause, "Administration of·the NlRA," p. 60. 

4vause , "Administration ot the NlRA," p. 61. 
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assumed the position of executive assistant in the' Spri.ng of 1934. 
During the final eight weeks of the NRA.'s lifespan, McKenna became 
8tat~ director of the NRA. 
Parallels to the response of many state governments to the NRA 
can be found in Oregon's thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth legislative 
assemblies.· By the end of 1933, twelve states passed "Little NRA" 
statutes--acts designed to supplement the NRA in one way or another--at 
the encouragement of federal officials. Three more states passed little 
BRA's, or state recovery acts, by March of 1935. Little NRA bills also 
reached the floors of twenty other legislatures. 5 If additional little 
NRA bills had been introduced in the summer of 1933, when the NRA was 
at its height of popularity, state recovery acts might. have proliferated.' 
But most state'legislatures had adjourned by the time federal officials 
began their drive for little NRA's. When most state legislatures recon­
vened in early 1935, enthusiasm for the NRA had dwindled. 
The intent of the various state recovery acts ranged from provid­
ing state enforcement of NRA codes, to establishing state codes of fair 
competition, to suspending state antI-trust laws. Bills formulated by 
federal officials that embodied all three of these aspects, which were 
5see Lewis Mayers, ed., A Handbook of NRA .( 2nd. eO-.;, New York and 
Washington: Federal Codes, Inc., 1934), pp. 397-436, for a compilation 
ot state NRA codes which were in effect by the first of 1934. Patter­
son, The New Deal and the States, pp. 112-18 gives a general survey a...'ld 
assessment of the states' political responses to the NRA. States having 
little NRA statutes by 1934 were California, Colorado, Kansas, Massa­
chusetts, New Jersey,~New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming. Indiana, New Mexico and Washington passed state recovery 
acts by March ,of 1935 • 
• 
'j ~1 
44 

called "model little NRA's," were not in a clear majority in actual 
state recovery acts tha.t became law. 
Neither geographical, industrial, nor a.gricultural tactors in­
tluenced the passage of little NRAts by states, although the most 
common opposition came from rural bloes. Much like the nationts response 
to the NRA in general, the chance of a state recovery bill becoming 
a statute depended more upon the time it was introduced than anything 
else. 
Very little is known about how effective little NRAts actually 
were in those states which had -them. James T. Patterson, the foremost 
authority upon the New Deal and the states, can offer little more than 
a general overview of the political responses of the s~ates to the NRA. 
However, considering the difficulty with which the NRA operated at the 
national level, it is doubtf'ul that the states did much better. 
Little NRA bills were introduced in the Oregon House during both 
the special session of the thirty-seventh assembly, which met in late 
1933, and the regul~ session of the thirty-eighth assembly in-early 
1935. MUltnomah County Democratic Representative William. L~ Dicksonts 
House Bill 55, "To encourage state- and national industrial recovery 
by coope~ating with national government in fostering fair competition; 
and declaring an emergency," passed the specIal session of the House 
6in amended form by a vote of forty-two to seventeen. The bill was 
6See Oregon, Journals of the Senate and House, 37th Legislative 
Assembly, 2d special session (Salem: State Printing Office, 1933) and 
Oregon, Journals of the Senate and House, 38th Legislative Assembly 
(Salem: State Printing Office, 1935). 
.. I 
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tabled in the predominantly Republican Senate, never to be mentioned 
again. In 1935, Dickson, three other Democratic representatives, two 
Republican representatives and two senators, one a Democrat and the 
other a Republican, introduced another House Bill (HE 103) which read: 
"To provide a state industrial recovery act; and declaring an emer~ency." 
This bill--a model act prepared by the NRA--passed the House and was on 
the table or the Senate until three days before final adjournment. The 
Senate passed the bill and it was signed by the President and the 
Speaker one day before adJ ournment. However, the act' a fa.te was to be 
pocket vetoed by Governor Martin. 
One irony of. House Bill 103 is that Governor Martin had earlier 
sent a message to the Houae before it was passed in which he \stated 
that: . , \ 
I am hopeful. that this State Recovery Act, which I am coJ­
vinced is essentially' fair to the public to the employe ~d to 
the employer, will be enacted by the Oregon state legislature.7 
But the supreme irony of the bill is that Martin submdtted the proposed 
act to the House in the first place! Martin's initial support and 
later pocket veto of ~he act can only be explained as an exercise in 
political maneuveri~g, since the bill was not amended in either the House 
or the Senate. Martin had pledged 'in his cSmpaign to n ••• place 
Oregon definitely in line ••• ft with the New Deal. 8 However, Martin 
TOregon, Journals, 38th Assembly, p. 348. 

80regon, Journals, 38th Assembly, p. 347. 
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had a peculiarly short memory when it actually came to supporting 
the Nev Deal.9 
Martin, whose election campaign was based upon a law and order 
and a pro-New Deal platform, subsequently changed his tune. He con­
tended that "'. • • the New Deal's social security program is driving 
this country into national socialism.'" Declaring himself a "Hoover . 
Democrat" regarding federal relief, Martin sa.id that "J. • • democratic 
nations have iost their moral force through pampering their people.' ,,10 
One disenchanted liberal Oregon Democrat commented that "'Whenever I 
recall that I voted for him, I "am so humiliated that I feel like 
migrating to South America to live among the Indians of the upper 
11Amazon for the balance of m:r natural life.'" 
Martin's actions regarding public power underscored his 
opposition to Roosevelt's program. The so.vernor favored private, 
rather than public, control of the electric power which could result 
trom harnessing the Columbia River. He militantly opposed the proposal 
tor a Columbia Valley Authority, styled after the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. One member of the Oregon Public Utility Commdssion wrote 
9Robert E. Burton, Democrats of Oregon: The Pattern of Minority 
Politics" 1900-1956 .(~ene: University of Oregon Books, 1970), p. 70; 
Earl Pomeroy, The Pacific Slope (New York: Altre~ A. Knopf, Inc., 1965), 
pp. 243, 249-50. 
lOSalem Capital J~urnal, Oct. 14, 1938, p. 1; quoted in Burton, 
Democrats of Oregon, p. 82, n. 86. 
llLetter, Wilbur R. Brock to Walter M. Pierce, June 3, 1973, 
University of Oregon Library, Walter -M. Pierce Papers; quoted in Burton, 
'Democrats 'of Oregon, p. 82. 
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that "Politics are certainly tunny. Here I am supporting Roosevelt' s 
power program and em opposed by a man [Martin] who was elected on a 
program to support the President and then [I was] ordered • • • to fight 
the President on Bonneville. ,,,12 The only time Martin seemed to be 
a friend ot Roosevelt and the New Deal was when he was campaigning 
tor oftice and when Roosevelt visited the state. 
Gera.l.d D. Nash comments, in a histor"'.f of western America. during 
the 'twentieth century, that "Although initial enthusiasm for the National 
Recovery Administra.tion • • • was high, in most western states it waned 
toward the end of 1933...13 Oregon was no exception. 
Western enthusiasm for the New Deal i tself followed the general 
trend ot sentiment toward the NRA. James T. Patterson comments that, 
"With the possible exception of the South, no section seems to have 
resisted so obdurately the plans of the federal government [as did the 
West during the 1930' s ] • n14 Bouyant approval of the New Deal rapidly 
turned to grudging acceptance and then to suspicion in much of the 
West by the mid-thirties. The rejection of the New Deal by the West 
12r.etter, Charles M. Thomas to ~ofalter F. Pierce, June 11, 1935, 
University of Oregon Library, Walter M. Pierce Papers; quoted in Burton, 
'Democrats 'of Orespn, p. 83. 
l3Gerald D. Nash, The American West in the Twentieth Century: A 
Short History of an Urban Oasis, (Englewood Cliffs', New Jersey: Prentice­
Ha.lJ., Inc., 1973), p. 161. ' , , 
14James T. Patterson, nThe New Deal in the West," Pacific' Historical. 
Review, XXXVIII (Aug., 1969), 320. The following discussion of the 
response of western states to the New Deal is drawn from Patterson's article. 
j ,II 
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rested upon, among other things, resistance to federal labor reforms' 
and tedenal relief. But there was also a lack of' progressive state 
administrations in the West during the Depression. Western states 
considered Washington to be encroaching upon their rights wh~n it intro­
duced programs in which it controlled the main part of financing. They 
were alrea~ inclined to distrust. federal bureaucrats •. Federal actions 
which suggested that the Roosevelt admdnistration favored the urban 
East--the Wagner act., the minimum wage law" and heavy relief spending 
in eastern cities--aggravated Western 'disenchantment with the New Deal. 
The NRA did seem to help the national economy in the early summer 
of 1933~ when factory production went up from an index of. 56 in March 
to 101 and industrial stocks rose f'rom 63 to 109. However, the market 
broke in mid-July. The boom was basically the result of businessmen 
attempting to produce, sell and buy as much as possible before NRA codes 
took effect. Whether Oregon's econ~ fol+owed the national pattern 
of' boom~and-bust is a matter of conj ecture, since there i~,'a lack of 
sophisticated economic statistics for the state in this period--especially 
upon a month-by-month basis. But a logi~al assumption to make would be 
that Oregon's economy' did not tollow the .national pattern .in the early 
, , 
summe~ of' 1933 because the state's eco~omy was not based upon facto~ 
. production, but extractive industries. Oregonians lost most--if not 
'all.-of their' enthusiasm 'for the NRA shortly 'after they discovered that 
recovery' could not be gained by signing a pledge, displaying an emblem 

in their windoW', and marching in a parade• 
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Hugh Johnson concluded in mid-July of 1933 that the NRA should 
become a. mass movement in order to g~er popular support for the Blue 
Eagle. It was a gamble, but Johnson said tha.t ,,- ••• it is a good 
gamble. I think I can put this thing over. ,,,15 ;rohnson's gamble paid 
ott in Oregon during the Blue Eagle drive; but after the campaign, it 
produced few dividends. An observer.of the NRA in Oregon during 1934 
commented tha.t: 
It is claimed that the Blue Eagle drive was necessary sa 
an emotional background for the whole recovery progr~. The 
trouble is that there now seems to be a considerable let-down 
trom the former emotional heights-~public reaction whi!~ 
threatens the success of much that has been established 
A notable example of the ~ecline_ in public enthusiasm for the 
BRA in Oregon occurred in November of 1934. Mayor Carson proclaimed 
the week of November 19 as Portland's first annual NRA compliance., week.17 
While it would seem that civic activities- would be abundant--if one 
were to judge from the previous year's activity in Portla.nd--no mass 
meetings, no pledge campaigns, and no' parades occurred. NRA compliance 
week quietly began and ended in Portland ~th little attention being 
given it by the public. Other cities and states did not have any mass 
meetings-or parades in the latter half of 1934 either. The NRA no 
15Special Industrial Recovery Bo~d, Proceedings, July 18, 19, 
1933; quoted in -Schlesinger, Coming of th~ New Deal, p. 113. 
16vause, "AdmInistration of the NIRA'," p. 23. 
170regonian, November 11, p. 9, November 18, p. 19, 1934. 
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longer' solicited an enthusiastic response from the publfc. 
The public's grasp of the NRA in 1934 and 1935 was no more con­
crete than it had been prior to the Blue Eagle drive in 1933. The 
NRA, slipping back to a position of a vaguely-conceived bureaucracy, 
was thought of as a false promise of recovery. 
Much was eXpected of the NRA by .the American people ~ In mid­
1933, the NRA was probably the most popular piece of legislation that 
the Thirty-third Congress has passed. The NRA provided a psychological 
stimulant for a short season; but when recovery was not forthcoming, 
public enthusiasm waned~ Like so many applauded panaceas which turn 
out to be false, the NRA provided a con~enient scapegoat upon which 
people could blame their economic maladies. 
By 1934, the NRA was a disappointment to many people. Its failure 
vas'due to a number of factors: administrative bungling; its attempt 
to -do too much at once by tackling every feasible industry rather than 
just a few key ones; the failure of the Public Works Administration 
to spend its money more rapidly under the leadership of "Honest Harold" 
Ickes, thus not "priming"- America's economic pump; niistaken assumptions 
upon the part of the government about the unselfishness of businessmen; 
and the essentially false analogy that was drawn between the functions 
and tasks of the NRA and the earlier War Industries Board.18 
Businessmen in general complained that the NRA was meddling in 
their affairs. Small businessmen in particular denounced the NRA as 
lBtIavley, New Deal and Monopoly, p., 135. 
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the'harbinger of federally-sponsored cartels and monopolies which would 
force them out of business because of the restraints imposed upon them 
by BRA codes. 
William. Randolph Hearst declared tha.t the initials ttNRAtt stood 
tor tlNo Recovery Allowed. 1119 The Darrow Committee' s initial report on 
the NRA stated that "'A return to the anti-trust laws • • • we believe 
to be one of the great needs of the times.,tf20 But most Oregon business­
men, far removed trom the financial centers of America, ~a.d fev specific 
complaints about the NRA. 
Small businessmen in Portland left no'public record of dissatisfae­
tion with the NRA, with the exception of L. L. Starr. However, Starrls 
frustration with the NRA came more from personal antagonism with Edgar 
Freed. James H. Cassell, executive-secretary of the Oregon Automobile 
Dealers' Association and a member of Oregon's Council of Code Authorities, 
contended in mid-March of 1935 that ". • • the vast majority of small 
b,usiness men [sic] in Oregon--automotive, grocers, butchers, bakers, 
barbers and what not desire the reenactment' [sic] of the National 
Recovery Act. tt2l But considering how closely Oregon's response to the 
BRA tollow~ the rest of the nation in other aspects, it would be a 
s~mewhat tenuous, position to p~ace much stock in Cassell's comment. 
19Schles1nger~ Coming 'of the New Deal, p. 121. 

20Schleslnger~ 'Coming of the New Deal, p. 133. 

21Letter, James H. Cassell to Frederick Steiwer, Dec. 14, 1934. 

Oregon Historical Society Manuscript Collection, Steiwer Papers. 
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Oregon's lumber industry was part of the movement which initiated 
the eventual suspension of lumber price provisions by the BRA in 
December ot 1934. The West Coast Lumbermen's Association, in October 
ot 1934, had voted formally to discontinue minimum prices because they 
telt code prices were too high. Two months later the NRA abandoned 
- 22price controls for the entire American lumber industry. 
Organized labor in Oregon responded to the NRA in the same fashion 
as did the rest of ~rganized labor in the nation. Labor's official 
newspaper, the Oregon Labor Press, vas a mouthpiece for the national' AFL. 
The Oregon Labor Press contained little in the w~ or di~tinctly local 
news in half of its four weekly pages; most of the news and articles it 
contained vere dispatches from the American Federatiop of Labor News 
Service. 
Just as a Kentucky State Federation of Labor handbill re.ad "The 
United States Government Has Said LABOR MUST ORGANIZE, ff the Oregon Labor 
Press said "Workers Forced to Organize." Just as the United Mine Workers 
Journal cautioned that "The [NIRA] will only be help:f'ul to those who help 
themselves" and Sidney Hillman, President of the eastern-based .Am.a.lgam­
ated Clothing Workers and member of the NRA I S Labor Advisory Board, 
recognized that labor would only get out of the NRA what it put into it, 
r 
the Oregon Labor Press said that labor would get out of the h'1tA "Only 
What We Fight Forf,,23 Pragmatic enthusiasm for the NRA was not limited 
22Hawley, New Deal and Monopoly, p. 115. 
23Quoted in Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 139; Bernstein, 
Turbulent Years, p. 75; Editorial, OLP, June 30, 1933, p._ 2_ 
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'to organized labor in Oregon; ,the entire American labor movement too~ 
a pragmatic view of' the BRA. 
Moreover" Oregon's labor movement vas not alone in being both 
~tagonized by and trustrated with' state and local governments. La.bor 
historian Irving Bernstein appropriately selected Turbulent Years as 
the title ot his detini,tive history of the Americ~ labor movement in 
the 1930's. Bernstein's title is indicative of the environment in which 
the entire American l~or movement fought tor recognition during the 
Depression. The 1930's were indeed a ,decade ot strife for allot 
American iabor in its relations with both management and state and 
local governments. 
Irving Bernstein com:ments that' ". • Section 7(a) • vas 
the spark that, rekindled the ~pirit of unionism within American 
"labor."24 Numerous strikes--involving both labor militancy and govern­
mental hostility--occurred from North to South and East to West in 
America. Oregon labor was certainly part of the mov~ent' toward 
unionism in America after the NIRA was passed. 
Organized labor in Oregon shifted its attention from the NRA to 
the National. Labor Relations ,Bill in early 1935, as did the rest of the 
American labor movement'. American labor had little time or inclina.tion 
to grieve over the death ot the NRA in May ot 1935; labor in the thir­
ties vas optimistic concerning its future. 
24Bernstein, Tut-bulent Years, p. 37. 
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The value ot a state stud1 lies in either corroborating or refut­
ing the interpretations which &r.e given a general topic f'or the nation 
as a whole. This paper buttresses the doDdnant historical interpreta­
tions of' America's response to the NRA. Oregon reacted in an almost 
identical fashion to the NRA as did the rest of the United States. 
-'
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